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Abstract
Business cycle correlations are state-dependent and higher in recessions than in expansions. 
In this paper, I suggest a mechanism to explain why this is the case. For this purpose, 
I build an international real business cycle model with occasionally binding constraints on 
capacity utilization which can account for state-dependent cross-country correlations in 
GDP growth rates. The intuition is that fi rms can only use their machines up to a capacity 
ceiling. Therefore, in booms the growth of an individual economy can be dampened when 
the economy hits its capacity constraint. This creates an asymmetry that can spill-over 
to other economies, thereby creating state-dependent cross-country correlations in GDP 
growth rates. Empirically, I successfully test for the presence of capacity constraints using 
data from the G7 advanced economies in a Bayesian threshold autoregressive (T-VAR) 
model. This fi nding supports capacity constraints as a prominent transmission channel of 
cross-country GDP asymmetries in recessions compared to expansions.
Keywords: international business cycles, business cycle asymmetries, GDP co-movement, 
capacity constraints, occasionally binding constraints.
JEL classifi cation: E32, E60, F41, F44, F47.
Resumen
La correlación entre los ciclos económicos depende del estado de la economía y es más alta 
en recesiones que en expansiones. En este documento sugiero un mecanismo para explicar 
la causa. Para este propósito, construyo un modelo de ciclo económico real internacional con 
restricciones de capacidad vinculantes ocasionalmente, que puede explicar las correlaciones 
cíclicas dependientes del estado entre países en las tasas de crecimiento del PIB. La intuición 
es que las empresas solo pueden usar su maquinaria hasta un umbral de capacidad. Por lo 
tanto, en los períodos de auge el crecimiento de una economía individual se puede atenuar 
cuando la economía alcanza su límite de capacidad. Esto crea una asimetría que puede 
extenderse a otras economías, creando así correlaciones entre países en función del estado 
de las tasas de crecimiento del PIB. Empíricamente, compruebo con éxito la presencia de 
restricciones de capacidad utilizando datos de las economías avanzadas del G-7 en un modelo 
autorregresivo de umbrales bayesianos (T-VAR). Este hallazgo respalda las limitaciones de 
capacidad como un canal de transmisión destacado de las asimetrías del PIB entre países en 
recesiones en comparación con las expansiones.
Palabras clave: ciclos económicos internacionales, asimetrías del ciclo económico, 
sincronización de movimientos del PIB, restricciones de capacidad, restricciones de 
capacidad ocasionales.
Códigos JEL: E32, E60, F41, F44, F47.
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Non-technical summary
This paper is motivated by the empirical observation that GDP growth correlations among
developed countries are significantly higher if the US economy is in a recession compared
to the US economy being in an expansion. This means that developed countries tend
to experience recessions at the same time, while recovery phases are less synchronized.
While this empirical finding has been the subject of some studies in the literature, possible
explanations of this phenomenon that can account for the observed GDP growth correlation
differences in a standard international macroeconomic model have been less researched.
In this paper, I suggest a mechanism to explain these differences. For this purpose, I
build an international real business cycle model in which producers face a short-term
ceiling to their production capacity. The intuition is that in the short-run, firms can
only use their machines up to a capacity ceiling and building new machines to increase
capacities takes time. Therefore, in booms the GDP growth of an individual economy
can be dampened in comparison to an economy in which such a capacity constraint is
not present, while a decrease in utilization in a recession remains unconstrained. This
so-called occasionally binding constraint on capacity utilization causes an asymmetry in
country specific business cycles that can spill-over to other economies via trade channels.
Thereby it creates state-dependent cross-country correlations in GDP growth rates such
as those observed in the data. In the benchmark model calibrated to a quarterly sample of
OECD countries and the US in a time period from 1961 to 2016, the model can account for a
quarter of the observed differences in GDP correlations between recessions and expansions,
while alternative calibrations show that the more the two countries in the model depend on
trade with each other the higher the explained difference in GDP growth correlations. In
an empirical exercise I successfully test for the presence of this type of capacity constraints
using quarterly data from the G7 advanced economies for the time period from at least 1980
to 2016, depending on data availability. I use an empirical method that can track spillovers
of aggregate productivity shocks from one-country to another and can also account for
differences in these spillovers depending on the shock being of a positive or a negative
nature (threshold autoregressive model, T-VAR). The empirical analysis yields that US
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as well as Foreign utilization adjustments are dampened for positive productivity shocks,
while adjustment is stronger and recessions are deeper for negative aggregate productivity
shocks compared to positive ones of the same size. This mirrors the asymmetric shock
responses generated by the model with the mechanism of an occasionally binding capacity
ceiling. The finding strongly supports capacity constraints as a prominent transmission
channel of cross-country GDP asymmetries in recessions compared to expansions. The
analysis of asymmetries in spillovers is crucial for policy-makers, as their presence implies
that there are differences in the magnitude of an economy’s responses to economic shocks,
depending on whether this economic shock is positive or negative. As a consequence a
policy-maker will have to adjust the magnitude of a policy response to a given shock
depending on the positive or negative nature of the shock.
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1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by the empirical finding that business cycle co-movements across
countries are higher during economic contractions than during economic expansions (e.g.
Yetman, 2011; Antonakakis and Scharler, 2012, as well as my own empirical evidence).
In an international real business cycle framework I investigate the reasons and potential
mechanisms that cause co-movements of GDP across countries to be state-dependent. In
the data, I find that the average pairwise correlation of GDP growth rates between 20
OECD countries in a quarterly sample from Q1:1961 to Q4:2011 is between 5.4 and 22.7
percentage points higher during recessions compared to expansions.1 The main purpose
of the paper is to build a framework in which country-specific shocks and their spillovers
to other countries endogenously lead to higher cross-country co-movements in GDP dur-
ing recessions. To achieve this asymmetry, I am introducing a friction in the form of an
occasionally binding capacity utilization constraint in an otherwise standard 2-country,
2-goods large-open economy model (e.g. Heathcote and Perri, 2002). The intuition is that
in the short-run, firms can only use their machines up to a capacity ceiling and building
new machines to increase capacities takes time. Thus, the friction can be interpreted as an
occasional inability to adjust capacity utilization beyond a certain degree within a given
period. At least in the short-run, this maximum capacity cannot be increased. The impli-
cation of the occasionally binding constraint is that following a sequence of good shocks,
a given country’s machines reach their maximum capacity and the increase in production
is dampened compared to an unconstrained economy. After a sequence of bad shocks,
machines can be left idle and the economy remains unconstrained. This introduces asym-
metric responses to shocks in the sense that negative shocks to one country have stronger
1Since the latest financial crisis led to a historical high in cross-country GDP correlations, the magnitude
of the result depends on whether this time period is included in the sample or not. Furthermore,
different procedures to disentangle recessions and expansions are compared.
effects on this country’s economy than positive ones. The crucial feature of the mechanism
to create state-dependent cross-country correlations is that the asymmetries also spill over
internationally because terms-of-trade and real exchange rate movements are not capable
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of cushioning these asymmetries in spillovers. Therefore, the full asymmetry is transmitted
internationally. Asymmetries can even be amplified by the presence of a similar occasion-
ally binding constraint in the other country. Countries are interlinked through trade in
intermediary production goods, as each country produces one of these intermediary goods
and uses the domestic as well as the foreign intermediary good in the production of a final
consumption good. Therefore, a positive (negative) shock to a given economy affects the
production of intermediary goods of both countries positively (negatively). Due to the fact
that negative shocks have higher effects than positive ones in this model with occasionally
binding capacity constraints recessions spill-over more intensively than expansions between
countries and this leads to state-dependent cross-country correlations. I show that the
proposed mechanism can match the differences in cross-country GDP growth correlations
between expansions and recessions observed in the data if tradable intermediary goods are
to a certain degree complementary. Lastly, I find empirical evidence for threshold effects in
the capacity utilization rate of the US economy and use the resulting threshold estimates in
a Bayesian threshold autoregression (T-VAR) to obtain asymmetric empirical responses of
the G7 advanced economies’ variables to positive, as well as negative US TFP shocks. The
resulting impulse response functions mirror the impulse responses of the theoretical model
and are taken as evidence of the importance of occasionally binding capacity constraints to
explain the observed asymmetries in cross-country GDP correlations between expansions
and recessions. The necessity of such an extension of the workhorse 2-countries, 2 goods
model arises from the fact that the standard model is not capable of producing asymmetries
in cross-country correlations, because it is absolutely symmetric and usually solved using
linear perturbation methods. Taking these asymmetries into account explicitly is relevant
for economic policy conclusions drawn from international real business cycle (RBC) mod-
els. Thus, economic policy conclusions drawn from linear and symmetric models might be
misleading if in the real world agents anticipate international asymmetries in the business
cycle and adjust their decisions to their expectations. The question of why business cycle
co-movements are significantly higher during recessions compared to expansions has to
the best of my knowledge not received much attention in the literature. From a financial
frictions perspective Perri and Quadrini (2011) and Bacchetta and Wincoop (2016) aim to
explain the extraordinary co-movements in the last financial crisis. However, in this study
I provide evidence that this phenomenon is not only limited to the last global recession but
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holds over a number of US recession. Furthermore, I advertise capacity utilization con-
straints as an important mechanism underlying this observations over the long run. This
channel can be viewed as complementary to the effects of financial frictions that the above
studies investigate. The empirical fact that business cycle co-movements across countries
are increasing in recessions has been pointed out by Yetman (2011). He takes the US
cycle and US recessions as reference data and shows that the co-movement of different
country groups (G7, Europe, Asia-Pacific) with the US business cycle is only positive and
significantly different from zero if the US is in a recession. Using a dynamic conditional
correlations (DCC) approach, Antonakakis and Scharler (2012) find that the cross-country
correlations between a number of developed countries significantly increases during US
recessions in the years between 1960 and 2009. Moreover, there are other references in
the literature which find that business cycles in the G7 countries become more similar in
recessions (for instance Canova et al., 2007) or that individual countries’ cycles are more
affected by the global cycle in global recessions (e.g. Claessens et al., 2013; Helbling and
Bayoumi, 2003). The mechanism put forward in this paper as a cause of state-dependent
co-movements in an international real business cycle model is an occasionally binding con-
straint on capital utilization. These types of constraints have already been used to explain
within country business cycle asymmetries, i.e. the fact that recessions are usually sharper
and shorter than expansions (e.g. Hansen and Prescott, 2005; Knueppel, 2014). In this
paper, I show that within-country asymmetries can also be a cause for international cor-
relations to become asymmetric between recessions and expansions. The threshold tests I
perform on US utilization rates support this mechanism and the T-VAR evidence obtained
using these test results are in line with the theoretical model results, further strengthening
the relevance of the proposed mechanism.
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2 Empirical analysis
To establish the fact that business cycle co-movements are higher during recessions than
during expansions, I obtain quarterly data on GDP for the time span of Q1:1961 to Q4:2011
from the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database.2 Due to data availability con-
siderations, I restrict the analysis to 20 out of 34 OECD countries, which I aggregate to
the country groups EU-133, G7, NAFTA and Oceania. A list of the countries included in
these groups is given in section 10 in the appendix. All of the series are at constant 2005
prices (OECD reference year), seasonally adjusted and converted to US dollar values. Fur-
thermore, I obtain annual population data from the OECD.Stats database and normalize
all observations of a year by population to obtain per capita values and take logarithms
of the series.4 To assess the patterns in international co-movement in US recessions and
expansions, I calculate different measures of correlation and co-movement in the business
cycles.
2.1 Disentangling expansions and recessions
Most of the empirical work on business cycle correlation during expansions and recessions
identify the US business cycle as a reference cycle for the analysis of co-movement in re-
cessions and expansions. Therefore, to identify recessions of the US economy most authors
in the literature use the NBER recession dates to disentangle expansions and recessions.
Because in this paper I additionally investigate the sources of asymmetries in business
cycle correlations, I need a procedure that can be applied to the empirical data as well
as to the model generated data in the same way. Therefore, to disentangle recessions and
2I also obtain annual data for the same time period from the Annual National Accounts database to
perform some illustrations and robustness checks.
3Greece and Ireland had to be excluded from the EU-15 because of data availability.
4Since population data is only available at annual frequency and GDP data is quarterly, I use linear
interpolation to obtain population size for the quarters within a given year.
expansions, I use the turning point algorithm developed by Harding and Pagan (2002).
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The algorithm identifies turning points in the log-series of GDP. If a given observation is
a maximum among the previous and the following 2 observations, the algorithm identifies
this observation as a peak. Similarly, if a given observation is a minimum among the previ-
ous and the following 2 observations, the algorithm identifies this observation as a trough.
Along the business cycle, expansions are defined as the time span between a trough to a
peak, while recessions are the time span between a peak to a trough. The algorithm also
performs validity check to ensure for instance that a trough is always followed by a peak
and vice versa. To see how the algorithm compares to the NBER recession dates, table 1
shows the recession dates identified by the turning point algorithm, as well as the NBER
recession dates.
Table 1 – Recession periods in the US, 1961-2011
NBER recessions TP recessions
Q1:1961
Q2:1962 - Q4:1964
Q2:1966 - Q4:1967
Q4:1969 - Q4:1970 Q2:1969 - Q4:1970
Q4:1973 - Q1:1975 Q3:1973 - Q1:1975
Q2:1976 - Q4:1976
Q1:1980 - Q3:1980 Q1:1979 - Q3:1980
Q3:1981 - Q4:1982 Q2:1981 - Q4:1982
Q4:1985 - Q1:1987
Q3:1990 - Q1:1991 Q2:1990 - Q4:1991
Q1:1993 - Q3:1993
Q1:1995 - Q1:1996
Q1:2001 - Q4:2001 Q3:2000 - Q1:2003
Q4:2005 - Q1:2006
Q4:2007 - Q2:2009 Q1:2008 - Q2:2009
The algorithm matches the dates and lengths of the NBER dated recessions well. At the
same time it identifies more recession periods than the dating committee at NBER. Most
likely, these episodes are downturns that the NBER did not find severe enough to term
them recessions, but they do fulfill the dating criteria of the turning point algorithm.5
5To check robustness I increased the time span to identify peaks and troughs from ±2 periods around
a given observation to ±3 and ±4. Although the identified recession episodes tend to get shorter,
the number of identified peaks and troughs does not change. Since ±2 is the number of periods used
by Harding and Pagan (2002) and this specification covers the NBER recession dates best, I use this
specification.
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2.2 Conditional Correlations
First, I calculate correlations of GDP growth rates between the identified country blocks
and the US, as well as between the individual G7 countries and the US, conditional on
the US being in an expansionary or recession period. I also test the difference between
correlation coefficients using a Fisher r-z-transformation of the coefficients.6 The results are
shown in table 2. All the correlations within the country groups increase in US recessions
compared to expansions. This is true for recessions identified by both NBER and the TP
algorithm. These correlation differences are highly significant for the EU-13 and the G7,
mainly because there are more countries in these groups and thus the sample size is larger.
Moreover, the differences for expansions and recessions identified by the TP algorithm tend
to be more significant since the number of expansion and recession (114 vs. 89) periods is
more balanced than using the NBER dates (169 vs. 35). Also for the individual countries
in the G7 group all correlation coefficients are larger in recessions compared to expansions.
Calculating the average correlation difference between all countries in the sample with the
US during the identified US business cycle states, I find differences of 22.4 percentage points
using the NBER recession dates and 24.7 percentage points using the TP algorithm. Both
of them are significantly different from zero at the 1% confidence level. As it is very likely
that the global recession of 2007-2009 has a large impact on the cross-country correlations
in recessions and expansions in the time period investigated here, I do the same calculations
as above, excluding the years 2007-2011 from the sample. The results are shown in table 3.
As expected, the differences decrease in general, but overall correlations in recessions are
still significantly higher than in expansions. For the individual G7 countries this result is
6This is necessary as correlation coefficients are defined on [−1, 1], while the test statistic on the difference
between coefficients is defined on (−∞,+∞).
reversed for Canada and Germany when recessions are identified by NBER dates, while for
the country blocks it is reversed for the NAFTA using NBER dates. For the other countries
and country blocks the main effect keeps its direction. Over the whole sample the average
correlation is 10.5 percentage points higher during NBER dates and 17.1 percentage points
higher during TP recessions. Both differences are significantly different from zero at least
at the 5% confidence level.
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Table 2 – Conditional Correlations - GDP Q1:1961 - Q4:2011
NBER TP
Country Exp Contr C > E Exp Contr C > E
Individual G7
Canada 0.2910 0.4007 Yes 0.2795 0.4279 Yes
France 0.0332 0.3729 Yes* -0.0256 0.4270 Yes***
Germany 0.1244 0.2923 Yes 0.0026 0.2336 Yes
Italy 0.0031 0.2704 Yes 0.0935 0.3206 Yes*
Japan 0.1111 0.3705 Yes 0.1165 0.4382 Yes**
Co UK 0.0797 0.4580 Yes** 0.0742 0.4276 Yes***
Observations 169 35 114 89
Country Blocks
EU 13 0.1370 0.3805 Yes*** 0.1318 0.3871 Yes***
G7 0.2346 0.4521 Yes*** 0.2201 0.4678 Yes***
NAFTA 0.4552 0.5655 Yes 0.4209 0.5471 Yes
Oceania 0.3701 0.4620 Yes 0.3802 0.4458 Yes
Observations Cou*169 Cou*35 Cou*114 Cou*89
Average
All 20 0.1177 0.3413 0.2236*** 0.1096 0.3562 0.2466***
p-value (2s) 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 20*169 20*35 20*114 20*89
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The table shows cross-country
correlations of GDP growth rates between the given country or country block and the US during
expansions (Exp) and contractions (Contr). Expansions and contractions are found using the NBER
recession dates in the NBER columns and the Harding and Pagan (2002) turning point algorithm in the
TP columns. The columns titled C > E indicate if the correlation coefficient is higher during
contractions compared to expansions. For the country blocks, Cou is the number of countries within a
given country block, excluding the US. For EU13 Cou = 13, for G7 Cou = 6, for NAFTA Cou = 2 and
for Oceania Cou = 2.
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Table 3 – Conditional Correlations - GDP Q1:1961 - Q4:2006
NBER TP
Country Exp Contr C > E Exp Contr C > E
Individual G7
Canada 0.2890 0.2873 No 0.2332 0.3394 Yes
France 0.0263 0.2462 Yes -0.0562 0.3222 Yes***
Germany 0.1413 0.1134 No 0.0154 0.1140 Yes
Italy -0.0199 0.1669 Yes 0.0239 0.1905 Yes
Japan 0.0871 0.1946 Yes 0.0683 0.3172 Yes*
UK 0.0534 0.3791 Yes -0.0127 0.3187 Yes**
Observations 155 28 99 83
Country Blocks
EU 13 0.1267 0.2592 Yes** 0.0994 0.2775 Yes***
G7 0.2253 0.3411 Yes 0.1817 0.3717 Yes***
NAFTA 0.4595 0.4539 No 0.4107 0.4728 Yes
Oceania 0.3658 0.4660 Yes 0.3672 0.4338 Yes
Observations Cou*155 Cou*28 Cou*99 Cou*83
Average
All 20 0.1099 0.2145 0.1046** 0.0809 0.2516 0.1707***
p-value (2s) 0.0215 0.0000
Observations 20*155 20*28 20*99 20*83
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. Footnotes of table 2 apply.
2.3 Yetman Synchronization
The literature has also proposed alternatives to correlation measures. For instance co-
movement measures, i.e. indicators if business cycles are in the same phase, have been
proposed (see for instance Yetman (2011) or de Haan et al. (2007)). Here, I am concen-
trating on a measure proposed by Yetman (2011). The co-movement measure of Yetman
(2011) is defined as the product of z-scores of annual GDP growth rates, i.e
ρijt = zitzjt (1)
where
zit =
(yit − y¯i)√
1
T−1
∑T
t=1(yit − y¯i)2
(2)
and y are GDP growth rates. The z-score normalization thus ensures that positive co-
movement is indicated if both countries are growing above or below their mean growth
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rate and negative co-movement is indicated if one country grows above its mean growth
rate while the other grows below its mean growth rate. Despite the degree of freedom
adjustment used in calculating the Yetman measure, the time average across co-movements
corresponds to the uncorrected correlations. Thus, the average Yetman measure is very
similar to the correlations above. Therefore, I do not state the results here explicitly. The
advantage of the co-movement measure is that it can be calculated at each point in time.
Concentrating on the co-movement between the European aggregate and the US, and using
annual data for illustrative purposes7, I follow Yetman (2011) and regress the co-movement
measure of 13 European countries with the US reference cycle on country fixed effects and
time dummies such that the coefficients of the time dummies indicate an average estimator
of European co-movement with the US reference cycle at a given point in time and the
standard deviations of these estimators indicate their significant difference from zero.
Figure 1 shows that even before the global financial crisis of 2007-08, significantly positive
spikes in the co-movement measure in most cases coincide with the NBER recession dates
of the US economy, while co-movement is moderately positive the remaining time.
Figure 1 – GDP Co-Movement with the US (1970 - 2006), NBER recession dates - Yetman
(2011)
In Figure 2 the crisis period is added to the previous figure. It is evident that the global
financial crisis of 2007-08 was an extraordinarily synchronized recession across developed
countries.
7Observations on the measure calculated with quarterly data is too frequent to create a nice and clear
plot.
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Figure 2 – GDP Co-Movement with the US (1970 - 2011), NBER recession dates
GDP correlations of all these countries with each other during US recession periods. To
obtain a clear picture of the state-dependent correlations in recessions and expansions of
all country-pairs on average, table 4 shows the average correlations across all country-
pairs for both considered time spans, as well as both recession identification methods. It
shows that cross-country correlations across all countries are significantly higher during
US recessions compared to US expansions. It also shows that the cross-correlations have
increased due to the recent global financial crisis, but that the most conservative measure
still indicates that cross-country correlations increased by at least 5.44 percentage points
during US recessions compared to US expansions if we exclude this recent crisis. In fact
though, the difference in correlations might have been as high as 22.7 percentage points,
if the recent financial crisis is considered a part of the underlying data generating process
of the global economy. Given the findings in this section, it is crucial that we understand
what might be driving differences in observed cross-country correlations during expansions
and contractions. In the following section, I propose a mechanism which can account for
these observed differences.
2.4 Average correlations of country pairs in US recessions
So far, the focus has only been on correlations of the countries and country blocks in the
sample with the US economy during US recessions. Now, I look at the average cross-country
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Table 4 – Correlations of country pairs
NBER TP
1961-2011
Country Exp Contr Diff Exp Contr Diff
Avg. Correlation 0.1910 0.3973 0.2270*** 0.1994 0.3389 0.1535***
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Obs. 210*169 210*35 210*114 210*89
1961-2006
Avg. Correlation 0.1862 0.2479 0.0679*** 0.1901 0.2395 0.0544***
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Obs. 210*155 210*28 210*99 210*83
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The table shows cross-country
correlations of GDP growth rates between all 20 countries during US expansions (Exp) and US
contractions (Contr). Expansions and contractions are found using the NBER recession dates in the
NBER columns and the Harding and Pagan (2002) turning point algorithm in the TP columns. The
columns titled ’Diff’ give the difference in correlation coefficient calculated for expansions and
contractions. The results are calculated for the full sample of Q1:1961 to Q4:2011, as well as for a
subsample from Q1:1961 to Q4:2006 which excludes the recent financial crisis.
3 Theoretical Analysis
Why do we observe that business cycle co-movements are significantly higher during re-
cessions compared to expansions and what are the consequences of this fact on the de-
cisions of economic agents and policy-making? Despite some studies of the most recent
global recession, the fact that these observations hold across a number of US recession
have to the best of my knowledge not been investigated in the literature. An understand-
ing of these differences is important because agents that anticipate systematic differences
in economic outcomes across the business cycle will adapt their economic decisions to
these differences. The standard international real business cycle model (IRBC), i.e. the
workhorse model with which economist model economic decisions in international macroe-
conomics, cannot generate asymmetries between countries of the magnitude observed in
the data. Although, for instance through the concavity of the utility function, the model
can produce non-linearities of some degree, due to their smoothness they are typically
small. Furthermore, these models are commonly solved using linear perturbations around
its deterministic steady state which by construction neglects non-linearities. Policy rec-
ommendations drawn by economists who base their conclusions on linear models when in
fact important non-linearities are present in the data might be misled. In this theoretical
section, I am building a framework in which country-specific shocks and their spill-overs
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to other countries endogenously lead to higher cross-country co-movements in recessions
compared to expansions. For this purpose, I am introducing a friction in the form of an
occasionally binding capacity utilization constraint in an otherwise standard 2-country,
2-goods large-open economy model (e.g. Heathcote and Perri, 2002). To solve the model,
I use the solution algorithm for models with occasionally binding constraints developed
by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), which is able to capture non-linearities arising from
the occasionally binding constraints. For the model to match the observed asymmetries
well, I choose to target the most conservative measure obtained by the empirical analysis.
Therefore, the targeted difference in line with the data is the increase of 5.44 percent-
age points between expansions and recessions obtained by applying the TP algorithm on
data excluding the global financial crisis. This number is also broadly in line with the
findings of Antonakakis and Scharler (2012). I will show that the model produces system-
atically higher cross-country correlations in contractions compared to expansions. In order
to match the targeted magnitude, tradable intermediate goods have to be complements to
a certain degree.
4 International Model with Occasionally Binding Capacity
Constraints
The model economy consists of Home country (1) and Foreign country (2). Despite the
occasionally binding capacity constraint it follows the exposition of Heathcote and Perri
(2002). Within these countries there is an identical measure of infinitely lived households.
Moreover, in each country, there exists a representative producer of a final consumption
good and a representative producer of intermediate goods. The intermediate goods can be
traded internationally, Foreign and Home intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes in
the production process of the final good. Final goods can only be invested or consumed in
the country they are produced in. The model economy experiences a random event st ∈ S
every period t. S is a possibly infinite set of states of the world. The history of events up
to and including date t is given by st. At date 0 Π(st) denotes he probability that any
particular history st has realized up to t. Households choose to supply capital and labor to
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intermediate-good-producing firms (i-firms). These firms are perfectly competitive. It is
assumed that households’ labor as well as their capital cannot be exchanged internationally,
i.e. it is internationally immobile. The capital stock ki(s
t) of each country i is owned by that
country’s households at any point in time t. Moreover, they choose the intensity with which
firms can operate the households’ machines. Households can only save in an international
uncontingent bond and therefore financial markets are incomplete. Households in each
country obtain their utility from consumption, ci(s
t), and leisure 1−ni(st). In the definition
of leisure, ni(s
t) is the amount of labor supplied and total period time endowment is fixed
at 1.
4.1 The maximization problems of the agents
In each country i = 1, 2 there is a representative final good producer, an intermediate good
producer and a representative household.
4.1.1 Intermediate good firms
The intermediate good firms produce country i’s intermediate good. They are termed a for
country 1 and b for country 2. For the production process they hire labor and rent capital
from the households, which own all the resources of the economy. Intermediate good firms
operate a Cobb-Douglas production technology
F (zi(s
t), ki(s
t), ni(s
t), ui(s
t)) = ezi(s
t)
(
ui(s
t)ki(s
t)
)θ
ni(s
t)1−θ (3)
where zi(s
t) is an exogenous technology shock. The rental rate on capital and the wage
rate in country i are given by wi(s
t) and ri(s
t). They are denoted in terms of country i’s
intermediate good. After history st, the static maximization problem an intermediate firm
in country i is
maxki(st),ni(st){F (zi(st), ki(st), ni(st), ui(st))− wi(st)ni(st)− ri(st)ui(st)ki(st)}
subject to ki(s
t), ni(s
t), ui(s
t) ≥ 0. (4)
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4.1.2 Final good firms
Investment adds to country i’s capital stock as follows:
ki(s
t+1) =
[
1− δ(ui(st))
]
ki(s
t) + xi(s
t). (5)
Here, δ(ui(s
t)) is the depreciation rate, which depends on the degree of capital utilization
in this model, and xi(s
t) is country i’s investment in terms of final goods. Final goods are
produced using intermediate goods a and b as inputs. They operate a constant returns to
scale technology and are perfectly competitive:
Gi(ai(s
t), bi(s
t)) =
{
[ω1ai(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)bi(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 if i = 1,
[(1− ω1)ai(st)σ−1σ + ω1bi(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 if i = 2.
(6)
The elasticity of substitution between goods a and b is σ and ω1 > 0.5 denotes the home
bias in the production of domestic final goods. The maximation problem of country i final
good firm’s after history st is
maxai(st),bi(st){G(ai(st), bi(st))− qai (st)ai(st)− qbi (st)bi(st)}
subject to ai(s
t), bi(s
t) ≥ 0 (7)
for i = 1, 2. qai (s
t) and qbi (s
t) denote the country i prices of intermediary goods a and b in
units of country i’s final good.
4.1.3 Households
The per-period utility for the country i household after history st is given by the standard
Cobb-Douglas utility function introduced by Heathcote and Perri (2002):
U
[
ci(s
t), 1− ni(st)
]
=
1
γ
[
ci(s
t)μ(1− ni(st))1−μ
]γ
. (8)
The budget constraints of households in country i is denoted in terms of the final good
produced in country i, where i = 1, 2. For the representative Home household this budget
constraint is given by
c1(s
t) + x1(s
t) + qa1(s
t)Q(st)B1(s
t)
= qa1(s
t)
(
w1(s
t)n1(s
t) + u1(s
t)r1(s
t)k1(s
t
)
+ qa1(s
t)
(
B1(s
t−1)− Φ(B1(st))
)
. (9)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1804
For the representative Foreign household it is
c2(s
t) + x2(s
t) + qa2(s
t)Q(st)B2(s
t)
= qb2(s
t)
(
w2(s
t)n2(s
t) + u2(s
t)r2(s
t)k2(s
t
)
+ qa2(s
t)
(
B2(s
t−1)− Φ(B2(st))
)
. (10)
Here, ci(s
t) denotes consumption and xi(s
t) is investment in country i. Both are denomi-
nated in i’s final good. The holdings of the international bond Bi(s
t) are denoted in terms
of the Home intermediate good a. The price of the international bond is Q(st). The wage
rate wi(s
t) and the rental rate ri(s
t) are denoted in country i’s final good. ni(s
t) is the
amount of labor supplied by the household to intermediate firms and ki(s
t) is the amount
of capital rented out to intermediate firms. ui(s
t) is the rate of capital utilization. In-
termediate firms pay the rental rate for each unit of effective capital ui(s
t)ki(s
t) in their
use. Φ() is a small adjustment cost on bond holdings that ensures the determinancy of
the international bond positions as for instance in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). The
functional form of the depreciation function is assumed to be
δ(ui(s
t)) = δui(s
t)η. (11)
I assume that there is an upper bound on capital utilization. The upper bound is motivated
by fact that individual machines cannot be used over their capacity of 100%. For the
economy as a whole, I assume that in the short-run total capacity utilization cannot be
above Φ which is expressed as a percentage of total production capacity in the economy.
Therefore it holds that
ui(s
t) ≤ Φ. (12)
The maximization problem of the representative country i household is
maxci(st),ni(st),xi(st),ki(st+1),Bi(st),ui(st)
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
U
[
ci(s
t), 1− ni(st)
]
(13)
subject to the budget constraint (9) or (10) for country 1 or 2, the respective law of motion
for capital (5) as well as the occasionally binding capacity utilization constraint (12).
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4.2 Equilibrium Conditions
The first-order optimality conditions for the households and firms are obtained from the
agents’ maximization problems outlined above. They are given in the Technical Appendix.
Next, I define the stochastic disturbances and the market clearing conditions.
4.3 Market Clearing Conditions
The bond market clearing condition states that the international bond is in zero net supply:
B1(s
t) + B2(s
t) = 0. (14)
For the intermediate good market the supply has to be equal to demand from Home and
Foreign:
a1(s
t) + a2(s
t) = ez1(s
t)
(
u1(s
t)k1(s
t)
)θ
n1(s
t)1−θ = y1(st) (15)
b1(s
t) + b2(s
t) = ez2(s
t)
(
u2(s
t)k2(s
t)
)θ
n2(s
t)1−θ = y2(st). (16)
For the final good market consumption and investment demand from households has to
be equal to the supply of the final good within a given country (as final goods are not
internationally traded):
ci(s
t) + xi(s
t) = Gi(ai(s
t), bi(s
t)) (17)
for i = 1, 2.
4.4 Exogenous process
The vector of shocks z(st) = [z1(s
t), z2(s
t)] follows the law of motion
z(st) = Az(at−1) + (st) (18)
with A being a 2 × 2-matrix and (st) being a 2 × 1-vector of independently distributed
random variables with variance-covariance matrix Σ.
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4.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is given by a set of policy functions for the Home house-
hold c1(s
t), n1(s
t), x1(s
t), k1(s
t+1), u1(s
t), B1(s
t), and the same policy functions for the For-
eign household c2(s
t), n2(s
t), x2(s
t), k2(s
t+1), u2(s
t), B2(s
t), obtained from the households’
first-order conditions, a set of choice functions of the Home and Foreign intermediary
and final good firms a1(s
t), a2(s
t), b1(s
t), b2(s
t), G1(s
t), G2(s
t), y1(s
t), y2(s
t), and prices
Q(st), r1(s
t), r2(s
t), w1(s
t), w2(s
t), qa1(s
t), qa2(s
t), qb1(s
t), qb2(s
t), such that, given the realiza-
tions of the random disturbances z1(s
t), z2(s
t) and the Lagrange multipliers on the occa-
sionally binding constraints λ1(s
t), λ2(s
t),
1. goods markets for intermediary and final goods clear,
2. factor markets for labor and capital clear,
3. the international bond market clears.
5 Solution Method
I am using the algorithm developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) (the ’OccBin’ toolkit)
to solve the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with occasionally bind-
ing constraints. In essence the solution algorithm relies on the fact that a model including
an occasionally binding constraint can be represented by a model with different regimes.
The model under investigation is log-linearized around the same point of approximation
under each of these regimes. The algorithm combines the information about which regime
prevails for the model economy in a given state and the dynamics within as well as across
these regimes. In this way a model with occasionally binding constraints can be solved and
simulated. As Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) point out it is important that the algorithm
does not only result in the model switching from one linear regime to another. Rather,
the anticipation effects of when a certain regime prevails and for how long it is expected
to prevail can create high degrees of non-linearity. In the following I briefly describe how
the algorithm works. In principle it implements a piecewise-linear approximation to the
agents’ policy rules. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) describe the algorithm mostly for an
example with one occasionally binding constraint. Since in an international model there
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are two identical countries, the model investigated here has two occasionally binding con-
straints. A model with two constraints has four regimes, one in which both constraints
are slack, two in which one constraint binds and the other one is slack, and one in which
both constraints bind. Under each of these regimes the model is log-linearized around its
non-stochastic steady state. Following the notation of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), the
regime that prevails at the steady state is called ’reference regime’ or (M1), the other
regimes are called ’alternative regimes’ or (M2), (M3) and (M4). Which combination of
the constraints bind or are slack at the reference regime does not matter for the algorithm.
But two conditions have to be satisfied in order for the algorithm to be applicable:
1. The Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions for the existence of a rational expectation
solution have to be fulfilled in the reference regime (not necessarily in the alternative
regimes), and
2. the model has to return to the reference regime in a finite number of periods in case a
shock moves it to one of the alternative regimes and agents expect no further shocks
to occur.
Closely following Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), but extending their description to a
model with two constraints, I will now define the piecewise-linear solution of such a
model. The occasionally binding constraints are denoted g1(EtXt+1, Xt, Xt−1) ≤ 0 and
g2(EtXt+1, Xt, Xt−1) ≤ 0. Assuming that under the reference regime neither of them binds
(M1) can be written
A11EtXt+1 +B11Xt + C11Xt−1 + F11t = 0, (19)
where X is n× 1 vector of all the endogenous variables in the model; Et is the conditional
expectations operator; A11, B11, C11 are n × n matrices of structural parameters for the
linearized model equations;  is a size m× 1 vector of zero mean i.i.d. shocks and F11 is a
m× n matrix of structural parameters. When g1 binds and g2 is slack, we can write (M2)
as
A21EtXt+1 +B21Xt + C21Xt−1 +D21 + F21t = 0, (20)
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where the notation is analogous to the one in (M1), with the addition that the n × 1
column vector D21 of structural parameters enters the system of equations because the
linearization is taken around an approximation point in which (M1) applies. Similarly,
regimes (M3) and (M4) are defined as
A12EtXt+1 +B12Xt + C12Xt−1 +D12 + F12t = 0 (21)
and
A22EtXt+1 +B22Xt + C22Xt−1 +D22 + F22t = 0, (22)
where the notation is again analogous to the regimes above. Definition 1 (Guerri-
eri and Iacoviello (2015)). A solution of a model with two occasionally binding
constraints is a function f : Xt−1 × t → Xt such that the conditions under system
(M1),(M2),(M3) or (M4) apply, depending on whether the occasionally binding con-
straints g1(EtXt+1, Xt, Xt−1) ≤ 0 and/or g2(EtXt+1, Xt, Xt−1) ≤ 0 bind or are slack. I
refer to the paper by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) for a detailed description of the algo-
rithm and to the OccBin toolkit for the codes to implement the solution procedure.
6 Results
6.1 Calibration
I am calibrating the model to produce quarterly simulated data. Therefore, I choose a
discount factor of β = 0.99. Relative risk aversion is set to the standard value 1 − γ = 2
and the capital share in intermediate good production is θ = 0.36. The consumption share
in utility is μ = 0.34, which is also standard values in the literature. The depreciation rate is
governed by two parameters, a standard linear component which I set to δ = 0.025, as well
as the component varying with capacity utilization η. The latter is calibrated such that the
steady state utilization rate of the model matches the US mean utilization rate of 80.32%
calculated over the period from Q1:1967 to Q4:2015. To match this moment, η is set to a
value of 1.57. The maximum capacity utilization is set to 80.9%, which is the threshold
value in the US capacity utilization rate estimated by a threshold vector autoregressive
model in section 7.2. The parameter for the small bond adjustment costs and capital
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adjustment costs are set to standard values. This calibration, as well as the calibration
of the shock processes follow Heathcote and Perri (2002). For two key parameters of the
model, the home bias in consumption ω and the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign intermediate goods σ, I distinguish two calibration cases. The first case, termed
’Benchmark Calibration’, includes a home bias in production ω that is calibrated to match
the OECD 20 import ratio of 45% calculated over a period from Q1:1980 to Q4:2015. For
the second case, termed ’High Difference’ I set the home bias parameter to ω = 0.6, which
induces a steady state import ratio of 80% and is for instance in line with the import
ratio of the Benelux nations (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). In a robustness
exercise I will show that a higher import ratio induces higher differences between business
cycle correlations in recessions and expansions. For the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign intermediate goods in the production of final good the two cases differ as
well. For the ’Benchmark Calibration’, I choose a value of σ = 0.7, which is an intermediate
value between the value chosen by Heathcote and Perri (2002) (σ = 0.9) and the lower value
Table 5 – Calibration
Parameter Description Calibration Target*
β discount rate 0.99
Φ utilization threshold 80.9% estimated US threshold
θ capital share 0.36
ω home bias in production [0.755,0.6] Import ratio (OECD 20)
σ substitution elasticity [0.7,0.5] Robustness check
1− γ relative risk aversion 2
μ cons. share in utility 0.34
δ depreciation 0.025
η depreciation 1.57 US mean utilization
φ bond adj. costs 0.0005
Shock process
ρii persistence 0.95
ρij shock spillover 0.025
Σii standard deviation 0.0073
Σii shock correlation 0.29
*The parameters for which no target source is given follow Heathcote and Perri (2002).
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used by Corsetti et al. (2005, 2008). In the ’High Correlation’ calibration, I take the value
directly from Corsetti et al. (2005, 2008) who estimate it to be σ = 0.5. Estimated values
for σ vary throughout the empirical literature. While Taylor (1993) estimates a value of
σ = 0.39 for the US, Whalley (1984) estimates a value of σ = 1.5. Thus, the chosen values
are well in range with the data. The benchmark parameter values are summarized in Table
5.
The occasionally binding constraint on capital utilization invokes that there is a physical
limit such that machines cannot be utilized more than their full capacity and that con-
structing new machines takes one time period. In the model, as a result of shocks, the
economy can be driven into situations in which the constraint binds and producers cannot
increase utilization to a level that would be optimal in the absence of the constraint. In
the next sections, I investigate the consequences of this physical bound on the symmetry
of business cycles and the cross-correlations of international business cycles created by the
model.
6.2 Disentangling expansions and recessions
Since I am foremost interested in whether my model can replicate the asymmetry of busi-
ness cycle correlations between expansions and recessions, I need to find a reasonable way
of disentangling business cycle phases in the simulated model data. For comparability I
use the exact same approach on the simulated data as I applied to the empirical data in
section 2.
6.3 Simulations
To investigate the cross-country correlations of GDP and other macroeconomic variables
I run 1000 simulations of 1400 periods each. I am dropping the first 1000 periods of each
simulation, such that the simulation results are not influenced by the initial conditions.
Therefore, in essence 1000 world economies consisting of two countries are simulated for 100
years. Both countries’ random disturbances are assumed to have a persistence parameter
of ρ = 0.95 and a standard deviation of σe = 0.0073. For illustration purposes I plot series
of the 400 valid periods out of the last simulation for the calibration using σ = 0.755.
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Figure 3 shows the simulations of GDP, capital utilization and the Lagrange parameter on
the occasionally binding constraint for Home on the left-hand and Foreign on the right-hand
side. The dashed line gives the simulations of the unconstrained model and the solid line
shows the simulations with the constraint imposed. Notice that GDP in booms is decreased
in comparison to the unrestricted model due to the binding capacity constraints. This
creates a negative skewness of GDP of the two individual countries. Another important
point is that the constraints on capacity utilization do not bind necessarily at the same
time. Moreover, one can see that the correlation of GDP is high for both countries, but the
effect of the constraint on cross-country correlations is difficult to interpret in this figure.
Figure 3 – Simulations
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6.4 International Correlations
First, I turn to the simulation moments in recessions and expansions overall in the uncon-
strained model, as well as in a model in which the constraint is occasionally binding. In
table 6 I summarize the correlations calculated from the simulated data in recessions and
expansions, using the benchmark calibration in the first column and the High Difference
calibration in the second column. In both cases, recession and expansion episodes are
determined using the turning point algorithm by Harding and Pagan (2002) applied to
simulated time series from the model. The first row gives the results for the unconstrained
symmetric model, while the second row shows the results for the model in which the con-
straint is invoked. The third row contains the correlation results obtained from the data.
In the linear model of the first row, the level of cross-country GDP correlations in reces-
sions, as well as expansions is around 0.19 in the Benchmark calibration case and increases
to around 0.56 in the High Difference calibration case. The higher level of international
Table 6 – Conditional Correlations from the Model - GDP
Benchmark High Diff
Contr Exp Contr Exp
Linear model 0.1863 0.1857 0.5586 0.5579
Difference 0.0006 0.0007
P-Value 0.4554 0.4862
Non-linear model 0.1603 0.1476 0.5073 0.4725
Difference 0.0127*** 0.0348***
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Data 0.2395 0.1901
Difference 0.0544***
P-Value 0.0000
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. Results are averaged over 1000
simulations of 1400 periods, dropping 1000 initial periods. The table shows cross-country correlations of
GDP growth rates between Home and Foreign produced by simulations of the model. The ’Home’
column shows the results for contractions (Contr) and expansions (Exp) determined using the Home
GDP series. The ’Foreign’ column shows the same results using the Foreign GDP series. Expansions and
contractions are found using the Harding and Pagan (2002) turning point algorithm. The left column
gives the results for the Benchmark calibration, while the second column given the results for the High
Difference calibration. Moreover, the first row gives the results for the unconstrained symmetric model,
while the second row shows the results for the model in which the constraint is invoked. The third row
contains the correlation results obtained from the data.
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GDP correlation in the High Difference calibration case is induced by a higher degree of
international dependence between the two model countries compared to the Benchmark
calibration case. The difference if Home is in recession is slightly positive, but not sig-
nificantly different from zero. This is true for both calibration cases. In the non-linear
model, for which simulation results are shown in the second row, the correlations if Home
or Foreign are in recession increase to 0.0127 and 0.0348 for the Benchmark calibration
case and the High Difference correlation case, respectively. In both cases these differences
are significantly different from zero at the 1% confidence level. Due to this significant
difference, the level of cross-country GDP correlations in the non-linear model increases
during recession periods compared to the linear model, while it decreases in expansions.
This result also holds for both calibration cases.
6.5 Robustness
To further explore how the difference in cross-country GDP correlations that the model
produces react to changes in the two crucial calibration parameters σ, the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate tradables, as well as ω, the home bias in final good
production, I calculate the correlation difference for distinct combinations of these param-
eters. Figure 4 shows the results of this robustness exercise. It shows the cross-country
GDP correlation difference produced by the model on the y-axis and the value chosen for
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods σ on the x-axis. Furthermore,
the home bias in the production of final goods is chosen to match domestic import ratios
of 45% (blue line), 60% (red line) and 80% (green line), respectively. The results show
that in general the more the two model economies depend on each other through trade
interlinkages, the higher the difference in cross-country GDP correlations between reces-
sions and expansions that the model can reproduce. In more detail, the lower the elasticity
of substitution between Home and Foreign intermediate inputs, i.e. the more they are
complementary, the higher the average difference in GDP correlations between recessions
and expansions. The same holds true the higher the targeted import ratio, which is set
using a lower degree of home bias in the final goods production sector of a given country.
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The model is able to replicate a difference in cross-country correlations of around 3.5
percentage points for the High Difference calibration case, which sets σ = 0.5 and targets a
high import ratio of 80%. This is at the lower end of the calibration range for the elasticity
of substitution and means that international intermediary goods have to have a certain
degree of complementarity in order to make international correlations higher in recessions
than in expansions. For a higher degree of substitutability producers are more flexible in
their choice of inputs, output is not depressed as much and spillovers are more symmetric.
This is the case for instance in the Benchmark Calibration case, which can produce an
average cross-country GDP correlation difference between recessions and expansions of
0.0127.
Figure 4 – Robustness of Correlation Differences
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6.6 Business Cycle Moments
In this section I am comparing the business cycle moments of the Benchmark and High
Difference calibration cases with their respective symmetric models, as well as with the
data. The symmetric models correspond to the case in which the occasionally binding
constraints on capacity utilization do not apply. The first column of table 7 shows the
volatilities of aggregate variables calculated from the model, as their standard deviation or
relative to GDP.
Output volatility is higher in the symmetric Benchmark calibration case than in the High
Difference calibration case. Furthermore, if there are occasionally binding constraints in
the model the volatilities decrease as the binding constraints dampen GDP movements on
the upside. The model simulated terms of trade in both non-linear calibration settings fare
better than their linear model counterparts, but are too low in comparison to the data.
The High Difference calibration fares better than the Benchmark calibration. Similarly,
the real interest rate is substantially lower than observed in the data and in the High
Difference calibration cases an even lower RER volatility is observed. Regarding exports,
and symmetrically imports, the High Difference calibration gets closer to the data, but both
calibration cases yield a lower volatility level than the data. In the non-linear solution case
these volatilities decrease in comparison to the linear case.
Still, the volatility of net exports in the non-linear High Difference case get closest to
the observed data and the import ratio for both non-linear cases are an improvement in
comparison to the linear model. The introduction of a non-linearity such as an occasionally
binding constraints on capacity utilization improves the model fit to the data in several
dimensions, while falling short to match the data better in a few other dimensions. In
general, the volatilities the model produces fall short of the data moments, despite in the
case of net exports.
The second part of Table 7 shows the volatilities of aggregate consumption, investment and
labor relative to GDP. For consumption the introduction of non-linearities slightly improve
the ratio of consumption volatility explained by the model. Investment volatility is best
fit by the linear High Difference model, but also the non-linear High Difference model has
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a better fit compared to the Benchmark calibration cases. The share of labor volatility
with respect to GDP generated by the High Difference calibration of the non-linear model
is slightly better than in the linear model, but all calibrations only explain around a third
of the volatility actually present in the data.
Table 8 shows the model generated correlations between macroeconomic aggregates and
output in the first part of the table and cross-country correlations of macroeconomic ag-
gregates in the second part of the table.
In terms of consumption-output correlation, the Benchmark calibration of the non-linear
model fits the data very well. In the benchmark calibration, the induced non-linearity can
help to improve on the common issue of real business cycle models that consumption and
output move too close together. The High Difference calibration induces a lower correlation
between output and consumption than in the data.
Table 7 – Model Fit: Standard deviations
Data Benchmark High Diff
sym. asym. sym. asym.
Volatilities (std in %)
Output 1.67 1.12 1.03 0.97 0.90
TOT 2.99 1.13 1.15 1.60 1.75
RER 3.73 0.42 0.43 0.16 0.18
Exports 3.94 1.01 0.90 1.06 0.96
Imports 5.42 1.01 0.90 1.06 0.96
Net exports 0.45 2.03 1.80 1.21 1.09
Import ratio 4.07 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.87
Volatilities relative to y
Consumption 0.81 0.34 0.35 0.40 0.41
Investment 2.84 4.24 4.09 3.07 3.37
Labor 0.66 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.26
For investment correlations with output, both benchmark calibrations and the linear High
Difference model fit the data almost perfectly, while the non-linear High difference model
produces a lower level of correlation. Labor correlations with output are too high in
the Benchmark calibration models compared to the data, while they lower than the data
moment in the High Difference calibrations. Non-linearity tends to lower this moment.
For exports and imports the Benchmark calibration has a fairly good data fit. In the High
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calibration case export correlation is higher than in the data, which might be due to the
high international dependencies in this model calibration. At the same time for the High
Difference non-linear case the import to output correlation is too low.
Regarding net exports, the Benchmark calibration case yields higher negative correlation
than observed in the data, while the High Difference case yields lower negative correlation.
The symmetric High Difference calibration gets closest to the data however. For the terms
of trade and the real exchange rate also the High Difference calibration is closest to the
data. Regarding the terms of trade especially, even the High Difference calibration fails
to overturn a positive correlation generated by all model calibrations to a negative one
observed in the data.
For capacity utilization the Benchmark calibration of the non-linear model fits the corre-
lation of utilization and output well, while the correlation is lower in the High Difference
case.
Table 8 – Model Fit: Correlations
Data Benchmark High Diff
sym. asym. sym. asym.
With Output
Consumption 0.86 0.91 0.89 0.77 0.70
Investment 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.68
Labor 0.87 0.97 0.96 0.66 0.52
Exports 0.32 0.40 0.45 0.94 0.87
Imports 0.81 0.94 0.90 0.93 0.42
Net exports -0.49 -0.61 -0.63 -0.40 -0.28
TOT -0.24 0.61 0.63 0.43 0.47
RER 0.13 0.61 0.63 0.43 0.47
Utilization 0.78 0.94 0.83 0.72 0.60
Cross-country
Output 0.21(all)/0.58(US) 0.21 0.18 0.63 0.55
Consumption 0.36 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.83
Investment 0.3 -0.42 -0.41 0.47 0.13
Labor 0.42 0.55 0.56 0.70 0.48
Utilization 0.70 0.62 0.56 0.80 0.72
The cross-country correlations of the macroeconomic aggregates show some interesting
patterns. The High Difference calibration is the only model that matches the US GDP
correlations with other countries well (0.58). At the same time, the Benchmark model and
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the linear model better match the empirical cross-country GDP correlations calculated on
a broader set of OECD country pairs, as presented in the Empirical Section (0.21). Non-
linearity decreases this correlation slightly. It has always been regarded as a shortcoming
of the international real-business cycle model that it cannot generate enough cross-country
GDP correlation. My model shows that with non-linearities and a certain degree of inter-
national dependency, the High correlation case matches the US GDP correlations originally
targeted by studies such Heathcote and Perri (2002) very well.
On cross-country consumption correlations all models generate too high correlations. For
investment the High Difference calibration is actually the only model of the three that can
generate a negative cross-country investment correlation as observed in the data. Finally
for utilization, the non-linear High Difference model is very close to the data observed
moment, while the other cases are not too far off either.
6.7 Impulse responses
To understand how the investigated mechanism works to create asymmetry, I compare the
impulse response functions to shocks of different magnitudes. The shocks are chosen to
have a standard deviation of σe = 0.0073. In this section, I compare impulse response
functions (IRFs) to positive and negative shocks to Home total factor productivity (TFP),
while holding Foreign TFP constant. For a one standard deviation shock, the occasionally
binding constraints are not violated, thus the IRFs for positive and negative shocks are
perfectly symmetric and the Lagrange multipliers remain at zero. To illustrate the work-
ings of the model when the constraint is violated, I therefore show IRFs to five standard
deviation shocks. This is a large shock that in practice will happen very rarely. Nonethe-
less, it should be kept in mind that during the model simulations both countries are hit by
a variety of shocks and that the constraint might become binding after several small and
persistent shocks hit the economy. From the simulations we saw that the constraint binds a
considerable number of periods for Home as well as Foreign. To concentrate on the effects
of a single shock to the Home economy, I assume a large shock to make the workings of the
constraint obvious. Technically the constraint starts to bind for the Foreign economy for
a three standard deviation shock, but the effects only become clearly visible for a larger
shock as the one shown.
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Figure 5 shows the responses of GDP, capital utilization and the intermediate good pro-
duction for a 5 standard deviation shock to Home TFP for Home variables on the left-hand
side, as well as Foreign variables on the right-hand side. The shown responses are obtained
using the benchmark calibration and to make the asymmetries in responses obvious, all
the responses to the negative shock are inverted. Therefore, the shown increase in Home
GDP following a negative to Home TFP, which is shown by the dashed red line in the top
left panel of figure 5, actually represents a corresponding decline in Home TFP. In figure 5,
Figure 5 – Impulse responses benchmark - 5 std TFP shock to Home
the constraints bind for both countries when the shock hits. In the response plots for GDP
in Home and Foreign one can see that the drop in GDP is larger for a negative shock than
the increase in GDP for a positive shock of the same size. This is true for the response of
Home GDP to the Home TFP shock, as well as for the spillover of this shock to Foreign
GDP. Therefore, the model can indeed create asymmetric international spillovers: Home
recessions have larger effects on Foreign GDP than Home expansions of the same magni-
tude. The responses for intermediate good production show that after a positive Home
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recessions have larger effects on Foreign GDP than Home expansions of the same magni-
tude. The responses for intermediate good production show that after a positive Home
TFP shock, Home intermediate good production increases by more than Home GDP, while
Foreign intermediate good production increases by less than Foreign GDP. Because GDP
is defined as the value of total intermediary good production in terms of final consumption
good,
GDPi,t =
{
qia ∗ F (zi,t, ui,t, ki,t, ni,t) if i = 1
qib ∗ F (zi,t, ui,t, ki,t, ni,t) if i = 2,
(23)
for Home and Foreign respectively, it varies with the value of imports through q1a and q
2
b . In
the Benchmark calibration case the two intermediary inputs are complements. Therefore an
increase in Home intermediate good production due to an increase in productivity devalues
the Home intermediate good relative to the Foreign intermediate good and in turn increases
the total value of Foreign intermediary production in terms of Foreign final consumption
good. As a consequence of this devaluation we observe the pattern that Home GDP
increases relatively less than Home intermediate production, while Foreign GDP increases
by relatively more than Foreign intermediate production. This relative devaluation of the
Home intermediate good is better understood from looking at the responses of variables
characterizing the international trade linkages between the two countries, which are shown
in Figures 6 and 7.
Figure 6 shows the responses the terms-of-trade, the real exchange rate and the net exports
of the Home as well as Foreign economies. Furthermore, in Figure 7 the responses of the
relative prices qji of Home intermediate good (marked with i = a) and Foreign intermediate
good (marked with i = b) in terms of the Home final good (marked by j = 1) or the Foreign
final good (marked by j = 2) are pictures, respectively. 8
8The terms-of-trade are defined as the price of the Home export good divided by the Home import good,
i.e. ToT =
q1a
q1b
, while the real exchange rate is given as the relative price of the Foreign final good
in terms of the Home final good, i.e. REX =
q1a
q2a
. Net exports of Home are given by the exported
amount of Home intermediate good minus the imported amount of foreign intermediate good denoted
in terms of the Home intermediate good, i.e. a2 − ToTb1. Analogously, Foreign net exports are given
by b1 − 1ToT a2.
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The aforementioned relative devaluation of the Home intermediate good is a consequence
of the decreasing terms-of-trade in figure 6, which is in turn caused by depreciating do-
mestic intermediate good price in terms of Home final good (q1a) and an relatively more
appreciating Foreign intermediate good in terms of Home final good (q1b ), shown in fig-
ure 7. The real exchange rate appreciates after a Home TFP shock by exactly the same
magnitude as the ToT depreciate. For a negative TFP shock, although the signs of the
relative price adjustments change, the relative magnitudes of these changes are exactly the
same, so that the ToT and the real exchange rate in this model react exactly symmetrically
to TFP shocks of opposite signs. It is especially important to point out that this holds
despite the asymmetries that are present between the responses to positive and negative
Home TFP shocks. Thus, although in absolute magnitude the responses of relative prices
are slightly higher for positive shocks compared to negative shocks, the relative magnitude
of these changes when compared to one another is the same for both positive and negative
Figure 6 – Impulse responses benchmark - 5 std TFP shock to Home
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ToT and the real exchange rate cannot act as a buffer to counteract them. As a conse-
quence asymmetries created by the occasionally binding constraint in the Home economy
fully spill-over internationally. This is also apparent in the response of net exports, as
shown in the lower half of figure 6. Net exports increase after a positive Home TFP shock
for both Home and Foreign with the response for the Home country being higher. More
importantly, for a negative Home TFP shock net exports for Home decrease visibly more
for a negative Home TFP shock compared to their increase after a positive Home TFP
shock and the same pattern holds for the Foreign net export response.
Figure 7 – Impulse responses benchmark - 5 std TFP shock to Home
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For the High Difference calibration, in figures 8, 9 and 10 I show the same plots as above.
Here we can see that the shocks to Home TFP spill over even more than in the Benchmark
case. The responses of GDP to a positive Home TFP shock are dampend in comparison to
a negative shock in both economies as expected. Note that the response of Foreign GDP
to a Home TFP shock is larger than on Home GDP. At the same time, as the response for
intermediate production shows, intermediate production rises much more in Home than
in Foreign. In the High Difference calibration case the two intermediary inputs are more
complementary than in the Benchmark calibration case. Therefore the devaluation of the
Home intermediate good relative to the Foreign intermediate good is further amplified,
as can be seen from figure 9. The terms-of-trade appreciates, while the real exchange
rate depreciates nearly twice as much as in the benchmark calibration case. Therefore,
a positive Home productivity shock in this case increases Foreign GDP by more than it
increases Home GDP. Moreover, from figure 10, we can see that in the High Difference
Figure 8 – Impulse responses high difference - 5 std TFP shock to Home
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Figure 9 – Impulse responses high difference - 5 std TFP shock to Home
calibration the asymmetry in the response of the relative prices of intermediary goods qji is
more obvious, but at the same time it stays proportional. Thus, the real exchange rate and
the terms-of-trade do not show asymmetric responses in the model. Because the magnitude
of the relative price changes is less different than in the Benchmark calibration, the shift in
the terms-of-trade is smaller than in the Benchmark calibration, while the shift in the real
exchange rate is higher. Net exports increase for both economies after a positive shock,
while they fall by a higher magnitude in response to a negative shock. Interestingly, Foreign
net exports only react with a lag to a positive Home TFP shock, while they immediately
fall after a negative shock.
Comparing the responses of GDP in the Benchmark and the High Difference calibration
cases, one can observe that the high spillovers in the High Difference case lead GDP in
both countries to jump downward on impact after a negative TFP shock in Home and
then gradually recover making the GDP responses highly correlated. For the positive
shock, as utilization is constrained the responses are dampened on the upside compared
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Figure 10 – Impulse responses high difference - 5 std TFP shock to Home
to the negative shocks. Crucially, in the Home economy, the full impact of the shock on
GDP is only reached gradually after about two years, while for the Foreign economy the
full impact is still reached immediately, making the GDP responses to a positive shock
less correlated than for a negative shock. Comparing this observation with the Benchmark
calibration one can observe that the foreign response is hump shaped for both positive
and negative Home TFP shocks. Thus, although the dampened Home GDP response still
induces a lower correlation of the GDP responses across countries, the difference in this
correlation between a negative and a positive Home TFP shock is less in magnitude under
the benchmark calibration compared to the High Difference calibration.
Overall, the impulse response analysis shows that the model can create asymmetric spillovers
and as I showed with the simulations, these asymmetric spillovers result in state-dependent
cross-country correlations that can match the observed differences in the data if I assume a
sufficient amount of complementarity between internationally tradable intermediary goods.
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Therefore, my empirical as well as theoretical findings show that we might miss a lot of in-
teresting features of the world, if we do not take into account asymmetries in international
RBC models.
7 VAR Evidence
After having shown that occasionally binding capacity constraints are capable of producing
business cycle asymmetry and asymmetric international spillovers for sufficient complemen-
tarity between intermediary goods, in this section I motivate this channel empirically. The
empirical equivalent of a regime switch due to occasionally binding constraints are threshold
effects in a given time series. Therefore, the assumption of occasionally binding constraints
on capacity utilization at the aggregate production level to explain state-dependent cross
country GDP correlations can be justified by the existence of threshold effects in capacity
utilization giving rise to business cycle asymmetries. In this section, I investigate the em-
pirical evidence on the presence of threshold effects in the capacity utilization rate of the
US economy. Moreover, the consequences that threshold effects within the US economy
have on each of the remaining six G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan
and UK) are explored. A complication is that the utilization series for Japan is indexed
and set to 100 in Q1:2010, therefore it is not directly comparable with the other series
which are given as percentage of total production capacity. The analysis proceeds as fol-
lows. In a first step, I test for threshold effects in US capacity utilization using Hansen
(2000)’s threshold test. In a second step, I use the threshold estimates from Hansen’s test
as informative priors for the estimation of a reduced-form threshold vector autoregressive
(T-VAR) model. Finally, using short-run zero restrictions, I identify a US TFP shock
and track its impact on US capacity utilization, US GDP, as well as Foreign9 capacity
utilization and Foreign GDP.
9Foreign refers to each of the remaining G7 countries on a rotating basis.
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7.1 Data
The GDP series and capacity utilization series are gathered using Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream from various national and international organizations (see table 12 in appendix). All
series are transformed to be seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census filter in EVIEWS
and the GDP series are at constant 2010 prices and per capita, if not provided in this
way. The US TFP series is derived Fernald (2012). To be in line with the model I use the
capital-utilization adjusted TFP series. The capacity utilization series for all investigated
countries despite Japan represent the percentage utilization of all available production
capacities across all industries of the respective country. The data availability for each
country is limited by the introduction date of a capacity utilization variable in both the
respective country and the US. For the US a quarterly capacity utilization measure is
available from Q1:1967, so this is the earliest possible data point for the international VAR
estimation.10 For the UK a capacity utilization measure is only available from Q1:1985
onward and thus US-UK country pair has the least observations available for the estima-
tion and testing procedures. The latest data point available for France, Germany and Italy
is Q4:2015, while for Canada it is Q3:2015 and for the UK it is Q2:2015. For the VAR
estimation I work with mean adjusted utilization levels to make the series fluctuate around
zero. Moreover, I work with annualized quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates and also
the TFP data of Fernald (2012) is provided in annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rates.
The hypothesis of stationarity of the used variables in a standard VAR cannot be rejected
for any country pair.11 Therefore, no further adjustments to transform the variables to
g g g
10Although for instance for Germany a measure is available from Q1:1960 onward.
11These tests have been conducted using the standard unit root tests in EVIEWS.
stationarity are necessary.
7.2 Hansen Threshold test
The threshold test is based on a regression of lagged dependent variables Xt−d on the
independent variable Yt. The independent variable in the regressions considered here is
the US GDP growth rate, while the X’s include 6 lags of first differences in US GDP and
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Foreign GDP, as well as the mean-adjusted level of US capacity utilization and Foreign
capacity utilization. The test allows for heteroscedastic residuals and is based on 1000
draws with a trimming value of 0.2 for all countries. I test for threshold effects in each of
the included lags of US capacity utilization. The results are shown in table 9.
Table 9 – Hansen (2000)’s threshold test - US utilization, mean adjusted - 6 Lags, 1000
draws
Dep.Var: US GDP
Threshold US-CAN US-FRA US-GER US-ITA US-JPY US-UK
Variable (adj.lvl) (adj.lvl) (adj.lvl) (adj.lvl) (adj.index) (adj.lvl)
uUSt−1 2.39 -2.23** -0.22*** 0.80*** -0.16 -0.08***
p-Value (0.32) (0.02) (0.005) (0.007) (0.170) (0.000)
uUSt−2 -0.61* -2.13** -0.05*** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08***
p-Value (0.07) (0.036) (0.000) (0.013) (0.030) (0.000)
uUSt−3 -0.4342 -0.43** -0.43*** -0.09*** 1.597* -0.89***
p-Value (0.26) (0.02) (0.004) (0.002) (0.087) (0.000)
uUSt−4 1.45** -0.83* 1.45** 2.39* 2.39** -0.57***
p-Value (0.02) (0.08) (0.048) (0.086) (0.021) (0.003)
uUSt−5 1.648* -0.58 2.39** 2.50* 2.70** -0.50**
p-Value (0.09) (0.06) (0.042) (0.097) (0.038) (0.016)
uUSt−6 2.385** -1.6 2.39** 2.39* 2.39*** -1.55*
p-Value (0.02) (0.16) (0.041) (0.078) (0.002) (0.069)
Avg. Thr. 1.21 -0.84 0.92 1.40 1.79 -0.61
Avg u US 80.34 79.65 80.46 80.21 80.24 79.51
Avg u FOR 81.17 84.33 83.64 75.05 112.08 80.80
Observations 192 159 193 187 190 125
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The specification always include six lags
of US TFP, US GDP, US utilization, Foreign utilization and Foreign GDP.
A first observation from the table is that with the varying availability of the capacity
utilization series, even for the US the mean utilization rate varies for each country pair,
though without large deviations from 80%. Moreover, the mean utilization rates of the
other G7 countries vary across countries in a range of 75% to 84%. The results of the
Hansen threshold test show that there are significant threshold effects in US capacity uti-
lization that determine the behavior of the US GDP series in all specifications. For Canada
there are significant differences in the effects of US capacity utilization on US GDP de-
pending on whether US capacity utilization was more than −0.61 percentage points below
its mean two quarters before or around 1.5 to 2 percentage points above its mean four to
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 48 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1804
six quarters earlier. The specifications for France, Germany and Italy all show significant
threshold effects in US capacity utilization for most of the previous 6 quarters. Germany
and Italy have significant threshold effects slightly below the mean of US capacity utiliza-
tion with up to three quarters delay, before having significant threshold effects considerably
above the mean level of US capacity utilization with over one year delay. For the specifi-
cation including Japanese data the interpretation of Japanese variables is different as the
utilization series for Japan is given as an index set to 100 in Q1:2010. Because in this
section, I estimate threshold effects in US capacity utilization, the interpretation of the
above results is the same as for the other country pairs. Similarly to the country pairs
including Germany and Italy, for Japan there are significant threshold effects if the US
capital utilization is slightly below its mean two quarters earlier and considerably above its
mean three to six quarters earlier (about 2 percentage points higher). While for Canada,
Germany, Italy, Japan the mean over all significant estimated thresholds is positive and
therefore threshold effects tend to occur if the US utilization rate was above mean in the
past, for France and the UK all significant threshold effects occur if the US utilization rate
was below mean. This indicates that for France and the UK threshold effects rather show
when US utilization was low in the past, compared to the other countries examined for
which they show when US capacity utilization was high in the recent past.
In the next section, using the estimated thresholds from Hansen’s test as informative
priors in the estimation of a Bayesian T-VAR, I investigate the empirical impulse response
functions to positive and negative US TFP shocks and their international spillovers.
If I find that in the high utilization regime GDP responses of the US and the rest of the
G7 countries to a positive US TFP shock are dampened in comparison to US and Foreign
GDP responses to a negative US TFP shock in the low utilization regime, this can be
taken as evidence that for four out of six country pairs there is statistical evidence of
capacity utilization constraints being a prominent mechanism to create GDP correlation
asymmetries in the investigated economies.
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7.3 Bayesian Threshold VAR
In this section, I investigate the effects of the presence of the above threshold effect on the
transmission of a US TFP shock through the US economy and to the other six countries
investigated here, with a special interest in the asymmetries that can arise within the US
economy and how they spill over internationally. For this purpose, I estimate a Bayesian
vector autoregression (VAR) that can account for the presence of different regimes depend-
ing on whether a certain threshold variable is below or above an estimated threshold value.
Therefore, this type of model is called a (Bayesian) threshold vector autoregression model
(T-VAR model).
7.3.1 Theory
With at least 2 regimes and at least 2 lags the threshold VAR models estimated in this
paper are highly parameterized. To improve inference using these models combined with
the limited data availability of macroeconomic time series, it is common in the literature
to estimate unrestricted VAR models by Bayesian methods. To obtain impulse response
functions, short run zero-restrictions are imposed on the responses of the variables included
in the VAR. The usage of Bayesian techniques in a setting like this allows the inclusion
of prior information on the parameters to be estimated in a natural way and therefore
improves the inference in these models. For estimation of this type of model prior dis-
tributions for all parts of the econometric model that are treated as exogenous have to
be assumed. A systematic way to do this for an underlying structural VAR model is to
use natural conjugate priors for which the prior, the likelihood and the posterior have
the same distributional form. This assumption allows the implementation of the dummy
variable approach to elicit priors for structural VARs following Sims and Zha (1998) and
Banbura et al. (2010). The posterior distributions of these exogenous model parameters
are derived from the prior distributions and the model’s Bayes factor. To be able to obtain
the posterior distributions and do inference on the model’s parameters some prior specifi-
cations require the use of simulation based techniques, such as Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) procedures. These MCMC procedures create a Markov chain converging to a
chain of drawings from the posterior distribution and thus allow the researcher to draw
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inference from posteriors that are analytically intractable. Frequently used procedures to
create such converging Markov chains are the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm or the Gibbs
sampler. The procedures I use to estimate the threshold VAR follow the algorithm of Chen
and Lee (1995), as used by Alessandri and Mumtaz (2013).12 This procedure uses a Gibbs
sampler to create the Markov chain from which drawings from the approximate posterior
distributions are obtained. The threshold VAR is given by:
Yt =
[
c1 +
p∑
j=1
A1,jYt−j + 1,t
]
St +
[
c2 +
p∑
j=1
A2,jYt−j + 2,t
]
(1− St) , (24)
with i,t N(0,Ωi) and St = 1 ⇐⇒ Y1,t−d ≥ Z for t = 1, ..., T . Yt is the N × 1 vector of
endogenous variables, which includes the first differences of US total factor productivity
(TFP), the level of US capacity utilization and US GDP growth rates for all presented
specifications and on a rotating basis the level of Foreign capacity utilization and the first
difference of Foreign GDP. Here, Foreign represents each of the G7 countries excluding the
US in turn. ci, Ai and Ωi are a constant term, the VAR-coefficient matrix and the variance-
covariance matrix of the iid disturbance term t for the two regimes i = 1, 2, respectively.
12Their codes are available under https://sites.google.com/site/hmumtaz77/code
These three matrices for the two VAR regimes contain all but two of the parameters of the
T-VAR. The other two are the threshold Z and the threshold delay d, which allows the
threshold to be triggered in a time period different from the realization of the threshold’s
effect on the dependent variables Yt. The Z and d parameters are unobserved and thus
have to be estimated. For each period, the threshold variable Z determines the prevalent
regime. Because I obtained estimates of the threshold value of US capacity utilization for
each country pair, I use this estimated value as initial value as priors for Z.
7.3.2 Parameters of Bayesian Estimation
To implement the Bayesian Threshold VAR estimation, parameters regarding the prior
distributions on the model parameters, the number of draws, as well as the simulation
horizon for the impulse response functions have to be set. I am using the mean of the
significant threshold estimates of Hansen (2000)’s test for threshold effects as mean of the
conjugate prior distribution on the threshold in US capacity utilization Z for each country
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pair. The assumptions on the estimation parameters are summarized in table 10. This
parameterization is in line with standard values chosen in the literature. In this calibration
I set the prior tightness parameter λP = 0.5, which is slightly looser than for instance the
parameterization of Alessandri and Mumtaz (2013), while the values of the prior tightness
on the sum of coefficients and the constant term are set according to those in Alessandri
and Mumtaz (2013). As the threshold estimates from the Hansen test conducted above
give a statistical indication of the threshold value in the data, I choose the variance on the
threshold value to be 0.5.
7.4 Impulse Responses
I am now using the threshold estimates of Hansen (2000)’s test for threshold effects as
priors and a Bayesian vector autoregression allowing for threshold effect (T-VAR) for the
US and the rest of the G7 country pairs. The following figures show the impulse responses
for a positive standardized US total factor productivity shock initialized at the mean levels
Table 10 – Bayesian T-VAR - Parameters
Parameter Description Value
Prior Threshold Z Canada 1.21
France −0.84
Germany 0.92
Italy 1.40
Japan 1.79
UK −0.61
σ2 Variance on threshold 0.5
Reps Simulation replications 20500
Drop Disregarded initial draws 20000
λP Prior tightness 0.5
τP Prior tightness on sum of coefficients 10 ∗ λP
P prior tightness on constant 1/10000
d Maximum lag in threshold 2
scalein Prior random walk variance 0.01
scaleex Standard deviation of simulated shock [−0.1; 0.1]
horzir Horizon IRF 40
The utilization series for Japan is indexed and set to 100 in Q1:2010, therefore it is not directly
comparable with the other series given in percentage of total capacity.
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of each variable. The standard deviation of the shock is set to 0.01 and the investigated
shock are a positive one standard deviation shock triggering the high utilization regime and
a negative one standard deviation shock triggering the low utilization regime. The iden-
tification procedure is a standard Cholesky zero restriction identification scheme building
on the assumption that a TFP shock contemporaneously affects all other variables in the
VAR (they are first in the variable ordering), while shocks to the other variables in the
VAR are not affecting US TFP contemporaneously.13
7.4.1 US responses to a US TFP shock
The US variables are included in the specification for each country pair. For brevity, I
concentrate on the responses of these variables obtained from the US-Canada specification
13This ordering is commonly used to identify a TFP shock. In the international setting foreign TFP is a
sensible candidate variable that could influence US TFP contemporaneously. However, due to the lack
of quarterly capital utilization adjusted TFP series for the rest of the G7 countries, foreign TFP is not
included in this analysis.
The figure shows that in responses to a positive US TFP shock (dotted lines with lighter
confidence bands), US capacity utilization and US GDP growth increase, while they de-
crease in response to a negative TFP shock (dashed lines with darker confidence bands).
Furthermore, in comparison with a negative TFP shock hitting the economy at the mean of
all the specified variables, i.e. a shock that does not trigger a regime switch, the responses
14The responses obtained from the other country pair specifications can be found in the appendix.
15For France and the UK the results indicate that a regime switch is triggered when a negative shock
hits the economy, as the impulse responses are initialized at the mean levels of each variable and the
threshold estimate is lower than the mean for France.
which are shown in figure 11.14 Despite for the case of France and the UK, the responses
are similar and the following interpretation is valid.15
for the positive shock are lower. Thus, I find evidence that positive TFP shocks have lower
effects on US capacity utilization and US GDP growth than negative TFP shocks of the
same magnitude, if one accounts for the estimated threshold effects in US capacity uti-
lization. I interpret this as an occasional inability to adjust capacity utilization beyond a
certain degree within a given period. This is the motivation to investigate the international
transmission of TFP shocks in a model with occasionally binding constraints on capacity
utilization in the theoretical section of this paper.
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Figure 11 – US - Canada impulse response functions - US variables
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Figure 12 – US - Canada impulse response functions - Canada variables
7.4.2 International responses to a US TFP shock
US - Canada
Figure 12 shows the responses of Canadian capacity utilization and Canadian GDP growth
to a US TFP shock.
Similarly to the domestic US responses, the Canadian responses show that there are positive
international spillover effects to a positive US TFP shock on Canadian capacity utilization
and Canadian GDP growth (dotted lines), while there are negative international spillover
effects on the same variables in response to a negative TFP shock (dashed lines). The
comparison between the responses to positive and negative US TFP shocks provide evidence
that negative US TFP shocks have higher international spillover effects to the Canadian
economy compared to a positive US TFP shock. Therefore, spillovers show the same
asymmetry that is present in the responses to US TFP shock in the US economy.
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US - Germany
Figure 13 – US - Germany impulse response functions - German variables
Similarly to the international spillovers of a US TFP shock to Canada, the German re-
sponses show that there are positive international spillover effects to a positive US TFP
shock on German capacity utilization and German GDP growth (dotted lines), while there
are negative international spillover effects on the same variables in response to a negative
TFP shock (dashed lines). The comparison between the responses to positive and negative
US TFP shocks provide evidence that negative US TFP shocks have higher international
spillover effects to the German economy compared to a positive US TFP shock. Therefore,
also for Germany spillovers show the same asymmetry that is present in the responses to
US TFP shock in the US economy.
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US - Italy
Figure 14 – US - Italy impulse response functions - Italian variables
As expected, the differences in the response of the utilization rate and partially also for
GDP go in the same direction as for Canada or Germany. The utilization rate changes
less after a positive TFP shock in the US in the high utilization regime, than in the low
utilization regime. For the first two quarters after the shocks are triggered in the different
regimes, the median negative shock response shows larger effects on GDP than the positive
shock. The effect after three quarters seems to be higher for the positive shock response
however. Thereafter, the responses are more or less symmetric. The aggregate effects of
the two shocks are similar for Italy.
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US - Japan
Figure 15 – US - Japan impulse response functions - Japan variables
The overall pattern of the US-JP responses is similar to the ones investigated above. The
effects of a positive US TFP shock triggered in the high utilization regime have lower effects
on Japanese capacity utilization and GDP compared to an equally sized negative shock
triggered in the US’ low utilization regime. Note that due to the difference in the scale
of the Japanese capacity utilization variable, the magnitude of the utilization response is
not directly comparable to those of the other countries. Qualitatively, however they show
the same pattern as for Canada, Germany and Italy. I omit the responses of France and
the UK here, they can be found in the appendix. This is the case because the threshold
estimates indicate a regime switch below average values of US capacity utilization.
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7.5 Summary of VAR evidence
The above analysis provides evidence that for four out of six country pairs, threshold effects
in the US capacity utilization rate cause asymmetric responses to a US GDP shock both
within the US economy and internationally. For these country pairs the data supports a
positive threshold in the utilization rate, i.e. in booms when utilization is high the response
to a US TFP shocks is dampened. The explanation of this phenomenon that I highlight
in this paper is that in US booms, more and more individual producers hit a capacity
utilization constrained where their machines work at their maximum production capacity
and producers take time to expand their capacities. In this way the full potential of a
positive TFP shock cannot transmit into production and thus dampens both the national
and international shock responses, while a negative shock is fully transmitted into the
production process, decreasing the utilization of existing machines. For France and the
UK there is evidence that the threshold effect is below mean utilization. Note that the
asymmetry in responses for France still goes in the same direction, i.e. the response to a
positive shock is dampened in comparison to a negative shock. Therefore, the asymmetry
in cross-country GDP correlations between France and the US in recessions and expansions
can be explained using capacity constraints, but the fact that these capacity constraints
are identified below mean utilization may be explained by additional channels being at
work dominating the utilization channel. I leave this to further research.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper I show that cross country correlations of GDP increase during recessions
compared to expansions and that this phenomenon can in part be explained in a real
business cycle model with occasionally binding capacity constraints. Intuitively, the con-
straints cause asymmetries in the business cycles of individual countries, which spill over
to other countries. Thus, spill-overs of negative shocks are higher than spill-overs of pos-
itive shocks, thereby causing the same correlation pattern as in the data. To match the
magnitude of the correlation differences in the observed data I assume a value for the elas-
ticity of substitution between tradable intermediate goods suggesting that they are to a
certain degree complementary. I successfully test the presence of capacity constraints as a
mechanism which leads to business cycle asymmetries empirically using data from the G7
advanced economies in a Bayesian threshold autoregressive model. This finding supports
capacity constraints as a prominent transmission channel of cross-country GDP asymme-
tries in recession compared to expansions. So far the exact consequences of asymmetric
cross-country correlations for the international economy and policy choices remain largely
unexplored. Exploring the consequences on agents’ choices and policy recommendations is
an interesting avenue for future research.
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9 Appendix
10 Country Groups
Table 11 – Country Groups
Group Included Countries
Full Sample Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, United States
EU-13 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom
G7 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
United Kingdom, United States
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, United States
Oceania Australia, New Zealand
11 Equilibrium conditions
11.1 Households
First, I will derive the first-order conditions of the Home household. The Lagrangian of
the country 1 household’s problem is given by
L = maxc1(st),n1(st),x1(st),k1(st+1),B1(st),u1(st)
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
π(st){1
γ
[
c1(s
t)μ(1− n1(st))1−μ
]γ
+ λ1(s
t)[qa1(s
t)
(
w1(s
t)n1(s
t) + u1(s
t)r1(s
t)k1(s
t)
)
+ qa1(s
t)
(
B1(s
t−1)− Φ(B1(st))
)
− c1(st)− x1(st)− qa1(st)Q(st)B1(st)−
φ
2
k1(s
t)
[
x1(s
t)
k1(st)
− δu1(st)η
]2
]
+ ϑ1(s
t)[
(
1− δu1(st)η
)
k1(s
t) + x1(s
t)− k1(st+1)]
+ ψ1(s
t)
[
Ψ− u1(st)
]}.
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The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂c1(st)
: μ
[c1(s
t)μ(1− n1(st))1−μ]γ
c1(st)
= λ1(s
t)
∂L
∂n1(st)
: (1− μ) [c1(s
t)μ(1− n1(st))1−μ]γ
1− n1(st) = λ1(s
t)qa1(s
t)w1(s
t)
∂L
∂x1(st)
: λ1(s
t) = ϑ1(s
t)
[
1− φ
(
x1(s
t)
k1(st
− δu1(st)η)
)]
∂L
∂k1(st)
: ϑ1(s
t) = β
∑
st+1
Π(st+1|st){λ1(st+1)[qa1(st+1)r1(st+1)u1(st+1)
− φ
(
1
2
(
x1(s
t+1)
k1(st+1)
− δu1(st+1)η
)
− x1(s
t+1)
k1(st+1)
)(
x1(s
t+1)
k1(st+1)
− δu1(st+1)η
)
]
+ ϑ1(s
t+1)(1− δu1(st+1)η)}
∂L
∂B1(st)
: Q(st) = β
∑
st+1
Π(st+1|st)
[
λ1(s
t+1)
λ1(st)
qa1(s
t+1)
qa1(s
t)
]
− Φ′ (B1(st))
∂L
∂u1(st)
: Ψ1(s
t) = λ1(s
t)
[
qa1(s
t)r1(s
t)k1(s
t) + ηδu1(s
t)η−1k1(st)φ
(
x1(s
t+1)
k1(st+1)
− δu1(st+1)η
)]
− ϑ1(st)ηδu1(st)η−1k1(st).
For the Foreign household the Lagrangian is
L = maxc2(st),n2(st),x2(st),k2(st+1),B2(st),u2(st)
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
π(st){1
γ
[
c2(s
t)μ(1− n2(st))1−μ
]γ
+ λ2(s
t)[qb2(s
t)
(
w2(s
t)n2(s
t) + u2(s
t)r2(s
t)k2(s
t)
)
+ qa2(s
t)
(
B2(s
t−1)− Φ(B2(st))
)
− c2(st)− x2(st)− qa2(st)Q(st)B2(st)−
φ
2
k2(s
t)
[
x2(s
t)
k2(st)
− δu2(st)η
]2
]
+ ϑ2(s
t)[
(
1− δu2(st)η
)
k2(s
t) + x2(s
t)− k2(st+1)]
+ ψ2(s
t)
[
Ψ− u2(st)
]}.
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The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂c2(st)
: μ
[c2(s
t)μ(1− n2(st))1−μ]γ
c2(st)
= λ2(s
t) (25)
∂L
∂n2(st)
: (1− μ) [c2(s
t)μ(1− n2(st))1−μ]γ
1− n2(st) = λ2(s
t)qb2(s
t)w2(s
t) (26)
∂L
∂x2(st)
: λ2(s
t) = ϑ2(s
t)
[
1− φ
(
x2(s
t)
k2(st
− δu2(st)η)
)]
(27)
∂L
∂k2(st)
: ϑ2(s
t) = β
∑
st+1
Π(st+1|st){λ2(st+1)[qb2(st+1)r2(st+1)u2(st+1) (28)
− φ
(
1
2
(
x2(s
t+1)
k2(st+1)
− δu2(st+1)η
)
− x2(s
t+1)
k2(st+1)
)(
x2(s
t+1)
k2(st+1)
− δu2(st+1)η
)
] (29)
+ ϑ2(s
t+1)(1− δu2(st+1)η)} (30)
∂L
∂B2(st)
: Q(st) = β
∑
st+1
Π(st+1|st)
[
λ2(s
t+1)
λ2(st)
qa2(s
t+1)
qa2(s
t)
]
− Φ′ (B2(st)) (31)
∂L
∂u2(st)
: Ψ2(s
t) = λ2(s
t)
[
qb2(s
t)r2(s
t)k2(s
t) + ηδu2(s
t)η−1k2(st)φ
(
x2(s
t+1)
k2(st+1)
− δu2(st+1)η
)]
(32)
− ϑ2(st)ηδu2(st)η−1k2(st). (33)
In addition, to the first order condition, also the budget constraints and the laws of mo-
tion for capital are optimality conditions. Because of the occasionally binding capacity
utilization constraint, two complementary slackness conditions form part of the optimality
conditions as well. They are
ψi(s
t)
[
Ψ− ui(st)
]
= 0 (34)
for i = 1, 2.
Now, we turn to the optimality conditions of the firms.
11.2 Intermediate Firms
The intermediate firm’s static maximization problem in country i after history st is given
by
L = maxki(st),ni(st){ezi(s
t)
(
ui(s
t)ki(s
t)
)θ
ni(s
t)1−θ − wi(st)ni(st)− ri(st)ui(st)ki(st)}. (35)
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The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂ki(st)
: ezi(s
t)θ
(
ui(s
t)ki(s
t)
)θ−1
ui(s
t)ni(s
t)1−θ = ri(st)ui(st) (36)
∂L
∂ni(st)
: ezi(s
t)(1− θ) (ui(st)ki(st))θ ni(st)−θ = wi(st). (37)
This simplifies to:
∂L
∂ki(st)
: θ
yi(s
t)
ki(st)
= ri(s
t)ui(s
t) (38)
∂L
∂ni(st)
: (1− θ) yi(s
t)
ni(st)
= wi(s
t) (39)
for i = 1, 2, where yi(s
t) = F (zi(s
t), ki(s
t), ni(s
t), ui(s
t)) wi(s
t) and ri(s
t) are denoted in
local intermediary good.
11.3 Final good firms
The country 1’s final good firm’s maximization problem is
L = maxa1(st),b1(st){[ω1a1(st)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 − qa1(st)a1(st)− qb1(st)b1(st)}.
(40)
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂a1(st)
: qa1(s
t) =
σ
σ − 1[ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1−1σ − 1
σ
ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ
−1 (41)
∂L
∂b1(st)
: qb1(s
t) =
σ
σ − 1[ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1−1σ − 1
σ
(1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ −1.
(42)
They simplify to
qa1(s
t) = [ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1ω1a1(st)− 1σ (43)
qb1(s
t) = [ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (1− ω1)b1(st)− 1σ . (44)
(qa1(s
t))σ = [ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1ωσ1a1(st)−
σ
σ (45)
(qb1(s
t))σ = [ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 (1− ω1)σb1(st)−σσ . (46)
a1(s
t) = G1ω
σ
1 (q
a
1(s
t))−σ (47)
b1(s
t) = G1(1− ω1)σ(qb1(st))−σ. (48)
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For country 2’s final good firm’s maximization problem is
L = maxa2(st),b2(st){[(1− ω1)ai(st)
σ−1
σ + ω1bi(s
t)
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1 − qa2(st)a2(st)− qb2(st)b2(st)}.
(49)
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂a2(st)
: qa2(s
t) =
σ
σ − 1[(1− ω1)ai(s
t)
σ−1
σ + ω1bi(s
t)
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1−1(1− ω1)σ − 1
σ
ai(s
t)
σ−1
σ
−1
(50)
∂L
∂b2(st)
: qb2(s
t) =
σ
σ − 1[(1− ω1)ai(s
t)
σ−1
σ + ω1bi(s
t)
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1ω1
σ − 1
σ
bi(s
t)
σ−1
σ
−1. (51)
And this simplifies to
a2(s
t) = G2ω
σ
1 (q
a
2(s
t))−σ (52)
b2(s
t) = G2(1− ω1)σ(qb2(st))−σ. (53)
12 Data Sources
Table 12 – Data Sources
Country Variable Source Datastream ID (if available)
US TFP Fernald (2012) -
Capacity Utilization Federal Reserve USCAPUTLQ
GDP BEA USGDP...D
Canada Capacity Utilization CANSIM CNCAPUTLR
GDP OECD CNOEXO03D
France Capacity Utilization OECD FROBS076Q
GDP INSEE FRGDP...D
Germany Capacity Utilization OECD BDOBS076Q
GDP OECD BDOEXO03D
Italy Capacity Utilization OECD ITOBS076Q
GDP OECD ITOEXO03D
Japan Capacity Utilization METI JPCAPUTLQ
GDP OECD JPOEXO03D
UK Capacity Utilization FRED -
GDP ONS UKGDP...D
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13 Domestic US responses in specifications with
Germany, Italy and the UK
Figure 16 – US - Germany impulse response functions - US variables
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Figure 17 – US - Italy impulse response functions - US variables
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Figure 18 – US - Japan impulse response functions - Japan variables
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14 Results on omitted countries
Figure 19 – US - France impulse response functions - US variables
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 72 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1804
Figure 20 – US - France impulse response functions - French variables
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Figure 21 – US - UK impulse response functions - UK variables
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Figure 22 – US - UK impulse response functions - UK variables
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